Coordinated Central Banks Liquidity Injections: Too Little Too Late To Address the Fundamental Problems of the Financial System
By Nouriel Roubini | Dec 12, 2007
Given the worsening of the global liquidity and credit crunch – with a variety of short term interbank Libor spreads relative to policy rates and relative to government bonds of same maturity being even higher recently than at the peak of the crisis in August – it is no surprise that central banks were really desperate to do something.
The announcement today of coordinated liquidity injections by FED, ECB, BoE, BoC, SNB is however too little too late and it will fail to resolve the liquidity and credit crunch for the same reasons why hundreds of billions of dollars of liquidity injections by these central banks – and some easing of policy rates by Fed, BoC and BoE – has totally and miserably failed to resolve this crunch in the last five months. What was announced today are band-aid palliative that will not address the core causes of this most severe liquidity and credit crunch.
There has some heated debate in recent weeks on whether the liquidity crunch is due to:
a) short-term year end liquidity needs (the “Turn”);
b) a more persistent liquidity risk premium;
c) a rise on counterparty risk and broader perceived credit problems of counterparties; i.e. serious problems of insolvency rather than illiquidity alone.
d) a more general increase in risk aversion due to severe credit problems and information asymmetries (risk aversion due to uncertainty about the size of the financial losses and uncertainty on who is holding the toxic waste of RMBS, CDOs and other ABS products);
e) the failure of the monetary transmission mechanism in a financial system where most financial institutions are now non-bank and thus do not have direct access to the central banks’ liquidity or lender of last resort support.
The severe financial crunch is likely due to all of the factors above; but the measures announced today can only partly deal with the first of the two explanations above of the crunch and will do nothing to address the other causes of the crunch. These measures will not be successful for a variety of reasons.
First, you cannot use monetary policy to resolve credit and insolvency problems in the economy; and most of the crunch is due not just to illiquidity but rather to serious credit and solvency problems of many economic agents (households, mortgage borrowers, subprime, near prime and prime mortgage lenders, homebuilders, highly leveraged and distressed financial institutions, weak corporate sector firms).
Second, monetary injections cannot resolve the information asymmetries and generalized uncertainty of a financial system where financial globalization and securitization have led to lack of transparency and greater opacity of financial markets; these asymmetric information problems that generate lack of trust and confidence and significant counterparty risk cannot be resolved with monetary policy.
Third, the US is at this point headed towards a recession regardless of what the Fed does as the build-up of real and financial problems (worst housing recession ever, oil at $90, a severe credit crunch, falling capex spending by the corporate sector, a saving-less and debt burdened consumer buffeted by ten separate negative shocks) in the economy make a recession unavoidable at this point; similarly other economies are also now headed towards a hard landing as the US real and financial mess lead to significant contagion and recoupling.
Thus, to mitigate the effects of an unavoidable US recession and global economic slump the Fed and other central banks should be cutting rates much more aggressively. The 25bps cut by the Fed yesterday is puny relative to what is needed; 25bps by BoE and BoC does not even start to deal with the increase in nominal and real borrowing rates that the sharp spike in Libor rates (the true cost of short term capital for the private sector) has induced.
And the ECB decision not to cut policy rates – and deluding itself that it may be able to raise them once the alleged “temporary” credit crunch is gone – is dangerous and ensures a sharp slowdown in a Eurozone where deflating housing bubbles, oil at $90 and a strong Euro are already sharply slowing down growth. Central banks should have announced today a coordinated 50bps reduction in their policy rates as a way to signal that they are serious about avoiding a global hard landing. Instead the Fed yesterday gave a paltry 25bps with a neutral bias rather than the necessary easing bias.
Fourth, the actions by the Fed today provide more liquidity to a greater variety of institutions but, as the Fed announced, these institutions are only “depository” institutions, i.e. only banks. The severe liquidity and credit problems affect today a financial market dominated by non-bank that do not have direct access to the liquidity support of the Fed; these include: broker dealers and investment banks that do not have a commercial bank arm; money market funds; hedge funds; mortgage lenders that do not take deposit; SIVs, conduits and other off-balance sheet special purpose vehicles; states and local governments funds (Florida, Orange County, etc.).
All these non-bank institutions do not have direct access to the Fed and other central banks liquidity support and they are now at risk of a liquidity run as their liabilities are short term while many of their assets are longer term and illiquid; so the risk of something equivalent to a bank run for non-bank financial institutions is now rising. And there is no chance that depository institutions will re-lend to these to these non-banks the funds borrowed by central banks as these banks have severe liquidity problems themselves and they do not trust their non-bank counterparties. So now monetary policy is totally impotent with dealing with the liquidity problems and the risks of runs on liquid liabilities of a large fraction of the financial system (in a world where these non-bank financial institutions play a larger role in financial markets than non-banks).
And let us be clear: the Federal Reserve Act striclty forbids the Fed from lending to non-depository institutions apart from very emergency situations that would require a complex and cumbersome approval process and the provision of high quality collateral. And the Fed has never – in its history – used this procedure and lent money to non-depository institutions.
Fifth, as discussed before on this blog, this is the first real crisis of financial globalization and securitization; it will take years of major policy, regulatory and supervisors reform to clean up this disaster and create a sounder global financial system; monetary policy cannot resolve years of reckless behavior by regulators and supervisors that were asleep at the wheel while the credit excesses of the last few years were taking place. Now the US hard landing and global sharp slowdown is unavoidable and monetary policy – if aggressive enough with much greater and rapid reduction in policy rates – may only be able to affect how long and protracted this hard landing will be.
Thursday, December 13, 2007
Monday, December 3, 2007
Symptoms
Jan Hatzius of Goldman Sachs forecasts a recession and that the growing credit crunch will reduce lending by about $2 trillion.
Home equity, credit cards, auto loans are all seeing a serious rise in delinquencies and foreclosures. Banks are having to eat into their capital base in order to reserve for growing losses. And that means they have less money to lend. And indeed, every survey I have seen for the past few months points to ever-tightening credit conditions for both business and consumers.
The structured security market is in a freeze, which is the funding source for much of the credit in the US and the world for such everyday things as car loans, credit cards, student loans, commercial bank loans, commercial mortgages, and construction. The CLO (mostly bank loans) market is reeling. There is no effective subprime mortgage market.
This current credit crunch has the potential for growing into a full-blown credit crisis, the likes of which we have not seen in the modern world. It is not altogether clear that cutting rates at 25 basis points per meeting is going to do anything to help, if the cost of borrowing does not come down. We are in an entirely different type of crisis than we have ever seen.
Home equity, credit cards, auto loans are all seeing a serious rise in delinquencies and foreclosures. Banks are having to eat into their capital base in order to reserve for growing losses. And that means they have less money to lend. And indeed, every survey I have seen for the past few months points to ever-tightening credit conditions for both business and consumers.
The structured security market is in a freeze, which is the funding source for much of the credit in the US and the world for such everyday things as car loans, credit cards, student loans, commercial bank loans, commercial mortgages, and construction. The CLO (mostly bank loans) market is reeling. There is no effective subprime mortgage market.
This current credit crunch has the potential for growing into a full-blown credit crisis, the likes of which we have not seen in the modern world. It is not altogether clear that cutting rates at 25 basis points per meeting is going to do anything to help, if the cost of borrowing does not come down. We are in an entirely different type of crisis than we have ever seen.
Insightful Parallel
Insightful parallel on the causes of the current credit bubble and subsequent meltdown. Income Disparities
From Beckoniong Frontiers, Eccles, pages 76 to 78.
As mass production has to be accompanied by mass consumption, mass consumption, in turn, implies a distribution of wealth -- not of existing wealth, but of wealth as it is currently produced -- to provide men with buying power equal to the amount of goods and services offered by the nation s economic machinery. (emphasis in original) Instead of achieving that kind of distribution, a giant suction pump had by 1929-30 drawn into a few hands an increasing portion of currently produced wealth. This served them as capital accumulations. But by taking purchasing power out of the hands of mass consumers, the savers denied to themselves the kind of effective demand for their products that would justify a reinvestment of their capital accumulations in new plants. In consequence, as in a poker game where the chips were concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, the other fellows could stay in the game only by borrowing. When their credit ran out, the game stopped.
That is what happened to us in the twenties. We sustained high levels of employment in that period with the aid of an exceptional expansion of debt outside of the banking system. This debt was provided by the large growth of business savings as well as savings by individuals, particularly in the upper-income groups where taxes were relatively low. Private debt outside of the banking system increased about fifty per cent. This debt, which was at high interest rates, largely took the form of mortgage debt on housing, office, and hotel structures, consumer installment debt, brokers' loans, and foreign debt. The stimulation to spending by debt-creation of this sort was short-lived and could not be counted on to sustain high levels of employment for long periods of time. Had there been a better distribution of the current income from the national product -- in other words, had there been less savings by business and the higher-income groups and more income in the lower groups -- we should have had far greater stability in our economy. Had the six billion dollars, for instance, that were loaned by corporations and wealthy individuals for stock-market speculation been distributed to the public as lower prices or higher wages and with less profits to the corporations and the well-to-do, it would have prevented or greatly moderated the economic collapse that began at the end of 1929.
The time came when there were no more poker chips to be loaned on credit. Debtors thereupon were forced to curtail their consumption in an effort to create a margin that could be applied to the reduction of outstanding debts. This naturally reduced the demand for goods of all kinds and brought on what seemed to be overproduction, but was in reality underconsumption when judged in terms of the real world instead of the money world. This, in turn, brought about a fall in prices and employment.
Unemployment further decreased the consumption of goods, which further increased unemployment, thus closing the circle in a continuing decline of prices. Earnings began to disappear, requiring economies of all kinds in the wages, salaries, and time of those employed. And thus again the vicious circle of deflation was closed until one third of the entire working population was unemployed, with our national income reduced by fifty per cent, and with the aggregate debt burden greater than ever before, not in dollars, but measured by current values and income that represented the ability to pay. Fixed charges, such as taxes, railroad and other utility rates, insurance and interest charges, clung close to the 1929 level and required such a portion of the national income to meet them that the amount left for consumption of goods was not sufficient to support the population.
This then, was my reading of what brought on the depression."
From Beckoniong Frontiers, Eccles, pages 76 to 78.
As mass production has to be accompanied by mass consumption, mass consumption, in turn, implies a distribution of wealth -- not of existing wealth, but of wealth as it is currently produced -- to provide men with buying power equal to the amount of goods and services offered by the nation s economic machinery. (emphasis in original) Instead of achieving that kind of distribution, a giant suction pump had by 1929-30 drawn into a few hands an increasing portion of currently produced wealth. This served them as capital accumulations. But by taking purchasing power out of the hands of mass consumers, the savers denied to themselves the kind of effective demand for their products that would justify a reinvestment of their capital accumulations in new plants. In consequence, as in a poker game where the chips were concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, the other fellows could stay in the game only by borrowing. When their credit ran out, the game stopped.
That is what happened to us in the twenties. We sustained high levels of employment in that period with the aid of an exceptional expansion of debt outside of the banking system. This debt was provided by the large growth of business savings as well as savings by individuals, particularly in the upper-income groups where taxes were relatively low. Private debt outside of the banking system increased about fifty per cent. This debt, which was at high interest rates, largely took the form of mortgage debt on housing, office, and hotel structures, consumer installment debt, brokers' loans, and foreign debt. The stimulation to spending by debt-creation of this sort was short-lived and could not be counted on to sustain high levels of employment for long periods of time. Had there been a better distribution of the current income from the national product -- in other words, had there been less savings by business and the higher-income groups and more income in the lower groups -- we should have had far greater stability in our economy. Had the six billion dollars, for instance, that were loaned by corporations and wealthy individuals for stock-market speculation been distributed to the public as lower prices or higher wages and with less profits to the corporations and the well-to-do, it would have prevented or greatly moderated the economic collapse that began at the end of 1929.
The time came when there were no more poker chips to be loaned on credit. Debtors thereupon were forced to curtail their consumption in an effort to create a margin that could be applied to the reduction of outstanding debts. This naturally reduced the demand for goods of all kinds and brought on what seemed to be overproduction, but was in reality underconsumption when judged in terms of the real world instead of the money world. This, in turn, brought about a fall in prices and employment.
Unemployment further decreased the consumption of goods, which further increased unemployment, thus closing the circle in a continuing decline of prices. Earnings began to disappear, requiring economies of all kinds in the wages, salaries, and time of those employed. And thus again the vicious circle of deflation was closed until one third of the entire working population was unemployed, with our national income reduced by fifty per cent, and with the aggregate debt burden greater than ever before, not in dollars, but measured by current values and income that represented the ability to pay. Fixed charges, such as taxes, railroad and other utility rates, insurance and interest charges, clung close to the 1929 level and required such a portion of the national income to meet them that the amount left for consumption of goods was not sufficient to support the population.
This then, was my reading of what brought on the depression."
Monday, November 12, 2007
Yen Carry Trade Fueling Stock Speculation
The 2007 year-to-date daily correlation coefficient between changes in the yen/euro spread and the MSCI World Index – best reflecting the total developed world stock market – is 0.93. For the S&P 500, it is 0.89, for the FTSE 100, 0.86, and for Germany’s DAX, 0.87. All higher than most people can fathom.
The correlation of the MSCI World to the yen/sterling spread is lower, at 0.75, but is still sky-high. To the Australian dollar it is 0.86 and to the Canadian dollar 0.81. All breathtakingly high. Only to the U.S. dollar, which everyone fears, is it materially lower at 0.37.
The correlation of the MSCI World to the yen/sterling spread is lower, at 0.75, but is still sky-high. To the Australian dollar it is 0.86 and to the Canadian dollar 0.81. All breathtakingly high. Only to the U.S. dollar, which everyone fears, is it materially lower at 0.37.
Wednesday, November 7, 2007
Beyond Words!
Fox News: "So why do we need a central bank?"
Greenspan: "Well the question is a very interesting one. We have at this particular stage a fiat money which is essentially money printed by a government and it's usually the central bank which is authorized to do so. Some mechanism has got to be in place that restricts the amount of money which is produced, either a gold standard or currency board or something of that nature because unless you do that, all of history suggests that inflation will take hold with very deleterious effects on economic activity. ... There are numbers of us, myself included, who strongly believe that we did very well in the 1870-1914 period with an international gold standard".
Fox News: "We did well without the Federal Reserve. People forget that."
Greenspan: "Well the question is a very interesting one. We have at this particular stage a fiat money which is essentially money printed by a government and it's usually the central bank which is authorized to do so. Some mechanism has got to be in place that restricts the amount of money which is produced, either a gold standard or currency board or something of that nature because unless you do that, all of history suggests that inflation will take hold with very deleterious effects on economic activity. ... There are numbers of us, myself included, who strongly believe that we did very well in the 1870-1914 period with an international gold standard".
Fox News: "We did well without the Federal Reserve. People forget that."
Tuesday, November 6, 2007
High Concentrations of Money and Power and Moral Hazards
"High concentrations of money and power provide trigger points for economic calamity that can be brought about by relatively few individuals or institutions. The potential harm which can arise from acts of malfeasance represents a moral hazard in our investment environment. Some financial theorists would argue that this risk is “priced in” to our investments so that what we invest in is fairly valued with respect to its risks. I see little sound rationale to accept this point of view. Risks that can be perceived and quantified can perhaps be priced in to arrive at an estimate of fair value for an investment. Many risks, such as the moral hazard of malfeasance, cannot be effectively quantified. The media, institutional, and governmental approach to representing these types of risks to the general investor seems to be to marginalize these risks. This approach gives a false sense of security and the impression that these risks are non-significant. This may be necessary to manage the perceptions of the general investor and retain confidence in the financial markets. From the perspective of the individual, this approach breeds complacency where there should be vigilance in the wise management of one’s assets."
The Emperor's Clothes: Megatrends Affecting Your Financial and Investment Decisions
The Emperor's Clothes: Megatrends Affecting Your Financial and Investment Decisions
Monday, November 5, 2007
Conductor Extraordinaire: Wen Jiabao
Premier Wen Jiabao "Questioned whether mainland investors were fully aware of the risks involved in investing in Hong Kong, noting many investors don’t have a strong grasp of the risks inherent in their own, stratospheric markets."
A political leader actually looking out for the interests of his people... those communists could teach western premiers some lessons!
A political leader actually looking out for the interests of his people... those communists could teach western premiers some lessons!
Wall Street's Stress Test
Broker earnings to give investors early damage report from credit crunch
By Alistair Barr, MarketWatch
Investors are about to get a look at the first major reports on the damage from this summer's credit crunch.
In a little more than a week, Wall Street's biggest firms report quarterly results. These companies are lynchpins of the global financial system, so their performance will be scrutinized for clues on how banks, other companies, capital markets and the broader economy are coping with a crisis that has hit close to home for some top brokers.
More than their peers, Lehman and Bear may be the most exposed to the credit crunch because they rely on fixed-income sales and trading more than rivals such as Morgan Stanley and Merrill, analysts said. Indeed, Lehman gets almost half its 2006 revenue from the business, while Bear got 44% of its revenue from there last year, according to Bernstein estimates.
Among the questions that are foremost on analysts' minds when the big brokers report later this month:
1/ Will firms have to cut the value of assets they're holding, resulting in charges that will cut into earnings?
2/ How much did the slowdown in fixed-income markets eat into the revenue that investment banks generate from selling and securitizing assets such as mortgage-backed securities?
3/ How deeply has the credit crunch cut the number of M&A deals that investment banks work on, especially those involving private-equity firms?
Market turmoil has its upside for investment banks too though. But it's still unclear whether higher trading volumes and surging volatility in equity, commodity and currency markets will make up for a torrent of bad news.
Wall Street's titans dominate trading and sales of securities in equity, bond and other markets, while advising on and helping to finance some of the biggest mergers and acquisitions. They've also been at the center of a surge in financial innovation in recent years that's created a huge credit derivatives market and rampant securitization, in which assets like mortgages and other loans are sliced into asset-backed securities and sold to investors. But many of these trends, which just a few months ago produced record earnings on Wall Street, have abruptly halted and even gone into reverse as problems in the subprime corner of the U.S. mortgage business spread across most of the credit market.
'Summer from hell'
In what Hintz calls "the summer from hell," bond investors fled to the safest government securities, while spreads widened dramatically on riskier forms of high-yield and other debt and leveraged loans used to finance buyouts. (The spread is the difference between yields on riskier debt and safer debt such as Treasurys).
The mortgage-backed securities market, which helped fuel the housing boom, froze up. The values of collateralized debt obligations, a further wrinkle in the recent securitization trend, collapsed. Some parts of the commercial paper market shut down and leveraged loans became difficult to sell.
The turmoil has already claimed many victims. More than 130 subprime mortgage origination companies have shut down or stopped offering loans since late 2006, Bernstein estimates. Several hedge funds have collapsed, notably two run by Bear Stearns. Even Goldman had to pump $2 billion of its own money into one of its big hedge funds after losses in August.
Kicking the tires
Some investors are waiting to see how these firms have faired in their fiscal third quarters before committing more money, Hintz said.
Momentum investors, who buy stocks of companies with rising earnings, have sold their positions in investment banks already, helping to push the shares lower. But value investors, who like undervalued stocks, are now interested because some brokers, such as Bear Stearns, are trading near historically low valuations, Hintz explained.
"Value investors are all waiting for the brokerage earnings," he said. "Will anyone blow up? How will future earnings be impaired by problems in the credit markets. They are doing a lot of research, kicking the tires, right now."
"Brave value investors will buy just before the earnings come out, but others will wait for a couple of them to report first before buying," he added. "If the investment banks make it through this quarter without announcing big write downs, then these will be very attractive stocks for value investors."
Valuation concerns
The credit crunch has increased concerns about how well investment banks value some of their assets. The firms hold some complicated securities that don't trade much, making them more difficult to value than things like stocks and government bonds.
"The more important, broader question is whether they can truly value the assets that they hold," Bove said. "And the answer is that they cannot. They've overstated their assets and therefore their book values, so the stocks should go lower."
These assets include so-called residuals, which are often riskier parts of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).
When an investment bank securitizes loans, they chop them up into different "tranches." Some slices are less risky, pay lower interest rates and have higher ratings. But to get AAA ratings on the best bits, investment banks sometimes have to take the riskiest tranches that are exposed to the first losses on the underlying loans, Bove explained. These are residuals.
Bear, Lehman, Goldman, Morgan Stanley and Merrill have between $4 billion and $11 billion of "residual interests" on their balance sheets, according to a report that Michael Hecht, an analyst at Banc of America Securities, issued on Friday. These include MBS, other asset-backed securities, CDOs, muni and corporate bonds, he added.
When investment banks arrange financing for LBOs, they usually provide a bridge loan to help the deal close quickly. They then sell the debt in the market. When LBO financing stalls or fails, these banks are left with so-called hung loans.
Such hung loans on the balance sheets of investment banks may have to be valued lower, cutting into earnings, Hecht and other analysts say.
The combination of lower valuations of residuals and hung loans could take a big chunk out of profit this quarter.
"We also expect a 34% sequential quarter decline" in third-quarter earnings per share, Jeff Harte, an analyst at Sandler O'Neill, wrote on Friday. He sees "significant asset markdowns, particularly in mortgage related securities and leveraged loan commitments."
Marking to model
Some assets are so esoteric and trade so infrequently that investment banks have to value them based on mathematical models, rather than the market prices of similar or related securities. These are known as Level 3 assets.
This, in theory, gives firms lots of leeway in valuing these assets, which include things like derivatives, private-equity investments, residuals of CDOs and mortgage-servicing rights, Bove said.
Wall Street firms use mark-to-model techniques to value 9% of the Level 3 trading inventory on their balance sheets, estimates Bernstein's Hintz. Goldman is top at 15%, while Merrill is bottom at 2%. (See table)
brokerage Percentage of Level 3 trading inventory valued using mark-to-model techniques
Goldman Sachs 15%
Morgan Stanley 13%
Lehman Brothers 8%
Bear Stearns 7%
Merrill Lynch 2%
Source: Bernstein Research
Level 2 assets are those that may not trade much, but that can be valued by checking market prices of similar securities and making assumptions about variables such as interest rates, Bove explained. These can include MBS, some corporate bonds and CDOs, he added.
The five largest U.S. brokers and the biggest universal banks -- Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase and Bank of America -- have $4.1 trillion of Level 2 assets on their balance sheets, according to Bove, who got the data from the companies' regulatory filings. That's almost 10 times their shareholder equity, Bove noted.
"A 5% wiggle in that number and you're looking at significant wipe out of shareholder equity," he warned.
'Highly unlikely'
Still, Hintz and other analysts are more sanguine about such valuation issues.
"A major concern is that all of the marks investment banks are using to value holdings are wrong and they will have to take large write downs," Hintz said. "That's a great press story but highly unlikely."
Investment banks track the value of their holdings very carefully, using computers that analyze a huge central "pot" of data. This feeds into other parts of their operations, including accounting, risk management and systems that check on counterparty and credit risks, Hintz explained.
Then, hundreds of controllers check the valuations of the assets on the balance sheet. When Hintz was CFO at Lehman in the late 1990's, he said, the bank had more than 800 staff in this area.
Such arrangements would make it very difficult for traders at these firms to value positions artificially high, he said. With so many other things relying on such valuations, it's also in investment banks' best interest to get it right and be conservative, he added.
"It is very difficult for inaccurate mark to model valuations to remain a secret," Hintz said. "And if I get my marks wrong, everything else is messed up in the firm. They may want to play games with valuations, but doing so would mean everything else was wrong too."
Fixed-income fallout
The credit crunch has also disrupted several markets in which investment banks have generated lucrative fees recently.
Sales of asset-backed securities are down 28% in the third quarter versus the second quarter and MBS issuance is off 24%, according to Banc of America Securities.
Sales of high-yield debt are down almost 32% in the quarter, versus the previous quarter, the bank also estimated.
Weakness in the MBS market will likely hit Lehman and Bear the hardest, analysts said. Bear was the leading underwriter of MBS last year, with an 11% market share, according to Dealogic data complied by Bernstein. Lehman was second with 10%.
Bernstein's Hintz expects Bear's third-quarter fixed-income sales and trading revenue to slump by half versus the second quarter. Lehman's may drop 37%, while Goldman and Morgan Stanley could see declines of 28% to 30%, he added.
Credit market problems have already disrupted some large leveraged buyouts. If investment banks continue to struggle to sell leverage loans that help pay for these acquisitions, M&A volumes may continue to drop from what were record levels earlier this year.
The volume of completed M&A deals during the third quarter is down by roughly 25%, Bernstein estimated recently, citing Dealogic data.
Still, equity trading volumes surged in July and August, while stock, commodity and currency markets became much more volatile. That will likely boost revenue and earnings in the equity and derivatives trading departments of investment banks, analysts said.
Equity trading volumes on the New York Stock Exchange are up 17% this quarter versus the previous three months and up 24% from a year ago, Banc of America Securities' Hecht noted on Friday.
Equity options volume is up 62% from a year earlier, he also noted.
Indeed, Hecht expects third-quarter results from the top investment banks to be a "stabilizing" event and advised clients to invest in the stocks ahead of the reports.
By Alistair Barr, MarketWatch
Investors are about to get a look at the first major reports on the damage from this summer's credit crunch.
In a little more than a week, Wall Street's biggest firms report quarterly results. These companies are lynchpins of the global financial system, so their performance will be scrutinized for clues on how banks, other companies, capital markets and the broader economy are coping with a crisis that has hit close to home for some top brokers.
More than their peers, Lehman and Bear may be the most exposed to the credit crunch because they rely on fixed-income sales and trading more than rivals such as Morgan Stanley and Merrill, analysts said. Indeed, Lehman gets almost half its 2006 revenue from the business, while Bear got 44% of its revenue from there last year, according to Bernstein estimates.
Among the questions that are foremost on analysts' minds when the big brokers report later this month:
1/ Will firms have to cut the value of assets they're holding, resulting in charges that will cut into earnings?
2/ How much did the slowdown in fixed-income markets eat into the revenue that investment banks generate from selling and securitizing assets such as mortgage-backed securities?
3/ How deeply has the credit crunch cut the number of M&A deals that investment banks work on, especially those involving private-equity firms?
Market turmoil has its upside for investment banks too though. But it's still unclear whether higher trading volumes and surging volatility in equity, commodity and currency markets will make up for a torrent of bad news.
Wall Street's titans dominate trading and sales of securities in equity, bond and other markets, while advising on and helping to finance some of the biggest mergers and acquisitions. They've also been at the center of a surge in financial innovation in recent years that's created a huge credit derivatives market and rampant securitization, in which assets like mortgages and other loans are sliced into asset-backed securities and sold to investors. But many of these trends, which just a few months ago produced record earnings on Wall Street, have abruptly halted and even gone into reverse as problems in the subprime corner of the U.S. mortgage business spread across most of the credit market.
'Summer from hell'
In what Hintz calls "the summer from hell," bond investors fled to the safest government securities, while spreads widened dramatically on riskier forms of high-yield and other debt and leveraged loans used to finance buyouts. (The spread is the difference between yields on riskier debt and safer debt such as Treasurys).
The mortgage-backed securities market, which helped fuel the housing boom, froze up. The values of collateralized debt obligations, a further wrinkle in the recent securitization trend, collapsed. Some parts of the commercial paper market shut down and leveraged loans became difficult to sell.
The turmoil has already claimed many victims. More than 130 subprime mortgage origination companies have shut down or stopped offering loans since late 2006, Bernstein estimates. Several hedge funds have collapsed, notably two run by Bear Stearns. Even Goldman had to pump $2 billion of its own money into one of its big hedge funds after losses in August.
Kicking the tires
Some investors are waiting to see how these firms have faired in their fiscal third quarters before committing more money, Hintz said.
Momentum investors, who buy stocks of companies with rising earnings, have sold their positions in investment banks already, helping to push the shares lower. But value investors, who like undervalued stocks, are now interested because some brokers, such as Bear Stearns, are trading near historically low valuations, Hintz explained.
"Value investors are all waiting for the brokerage earnings," he said. "Will anyone blow up? How will future earnings be impaired by problems in the credit markets. They are doing a lot of research, kicking the tires, right now."
"Brave value investors will buy just before the earnings come out, but others will wait for a couple of them to report first before buying," he added. "If the investment banks make it through this quarter without announcing big write downs, then these will be very attractive stocks for value investors."
Valuation concerns
The credit crunch has increased concerns about how well investment banks value some of their assets. The firms hold some complicated securities that don't trade much, making them more difficult to value than things like stocks and government bonds.
"The more important, broader question is whether they can truly value the assets that they hold," Bove said. "And the answer is that they cannot. They've overstated their assets and therefore their book values, so the stocks should go lower."
These assets include so-called residuals, which are often riskier parts of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).
When an investment bank securitizes loans, they chop them up into different "tranches." Some slices are less risky, pay lower interest rates and have higher ratings. But to get AAA ratings on the best bits, investment banks sometimes have to take the riskiest tranches that are exposed to the first losses on the underlying loans, Bove explained. These are residuals.
Bear, Lehman, Goldman, Morgan Stanley and Merrill have between $4 billion and $11 billion of "residual interests" on their balance sheets, according to a report that Michael Hecht, an analyst at Banc of America Securities, issued on Friday. These include MBS, other asset-backed securities, CDOs, muni and corporate bonds, he added.
When investment banks arrange financing for LBOs, they usually provide a bridge loan to help the deal close quickly. They then sell the debt in the market. When LBO financing stalls or fails, these banks are left with so-called hung loans.
Such hung loans on the balance sheets of investment banks may have to be valued lower, cutting into earnings, Hecht and other analysts say.
The combination of lower valuations of residuals and hung loans could take a big chunk out of profit this quarter.
"We also expect a 34% sequential quarter decline" in third-quarter earnings per share, Jeff Harte, an analyst at Sandler O'Neill, wrote on Friday. He sees "significant asset markdowns, particularly in mortgage related securities and leveraged loan commitments."
Marking to model
Some assets are so esoteric and trade so infrequently that investment banks have to value them based on mathematical models, rather than the market prices of similar or related securities. These are known as Level 3 assets.
This, in theory, gives firms lots of leeway in valuing these assets, which include things like derivatives, private-equity investments, residuals of CDOs and mortgage-servicing rights, Bove said.
Wall Street firms use mark-to-model techniques to value 9% of the Level 3 trading inventory on their balance sheets, estimates Bernstein's Hintz. Goldman is top at 15%, while Merrill is bottom at 2%. (See table)
brokerage Percentage of Level 3 trading inventory valued using mark-to-model techniques
Goldman Sachs 15%
Morgan Stanley 13%
Lehman Brothers 8%
Bear Stearns 7%
Merrill Lynch 2%
Source: Bernstein Research
Level 2 assets are those that may not trade much, but that can be valued by checking market prices of similar securities and making assumptions about variables such as interest rates, Bove explained. These can include MBS, some corporate bonds and CDOs, he added.
The five largest U.S. brokers and the biggest universal banks -- Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase and Bank of America -- have $4.1 trillion of Level 2 assets on their balance sheets, according to Bove, who got the data from the companies' regulatory filings. That's almost 10 times their shareholder equity, Bove noted.
"A 5% wiggle in that number and you're looking at significant wipe out of shareholder equity," he warned.
'Highly unlikely'
Still, Hintz and other analysts are more sanguine about such valuation issues.
"A major concern is that all of the marks investment banks are using to value holdings are wrong and they will have to take large write downs," Hintz said. "That's a great press story but highly unlikely."
Investment banks track the value of their holdings very carefully, using computers that analyze a huge central "pot" of data. This feeds into other parts of their operations, including accounting, risk management and systems that check on counterparty and credit risks, Hintz explained.
Then, hundreds of controllers check the valuations of the assets on the balance sheet. When Hintz was CFO at Lehman in the late 1990's, he said, the bank had more than 800 staff in this area.
Such arrangements would make it very difficult for traders at these firms to value positions artificially high, he said. With so many other things relying on such valuations, it's also in investment banks' best interest to get it right and be conservative, he added.
"It is very difficult for inaccurate mark to model valuations to remain a secret," Hintz said. "And if I get my marks wrong, everything else is messed up in the firm. They may want to play games with valuations, but doing so would mean everything else was wrong too."
Fixed-income fallout
The credit crunch has also disrupted several markets in which investment banks have generated lucrative fees recently.
Sales of asset-backed securities are down 28% in the third quarter versus the second quarter and MBS issuance is off 24%, according to Banc of America Securities.
Sales of high-yield debt are down almost 32% in the quarter, versus the previous quarter, the bank also estimated.
Weakness in the MBS market will likely hit Lehman and Bear the hardest, analysts said. Bear was the leading underwriter of MBS last year, with an 11% market share, according to Dealogic data complied by Bernstein. Lehman was second with 10%.
Bernstein's Hintz expects Bear's third-quarter fixed-income sales and trading revenue to slump by half versus the second quarter. Lehman's may drop 37%, while Goldman and Morgan Stanley could see declines of 28% to 30%, he added.
Credit market problems have already disrupted some large leveraged buyouts. If investment banks continue to struggle to sell leverage loans that help pay for these acquisitions, M&A volumes may continue to drop from what were record levels earlier this year.
The volume of completed M&A deals during the third quarter is down by roughly 25%, Bernstein estimated recently, citing Dealogic data.
Still, equity trading volumes surged in July and August, while stock, commodity and currency markets became much more volatile. That will likely boost revenue and earnings in the equity and derivatives trading departments of investment banks, analysts said.
Equity trading volumes on the New York Stock Exchange are up 17% this quarter versus the previous three months and up 24% from a year ago, Banc of America Securities' Hecht noted on Friday.
Equity options volume is up 62% from a year earlier, he also noted.
Indeed, Hecht expects third-quarter results from the top investment banks to be a "stabilizing" event and advised clients to invest in the stocks ahead of the reports.
Friday, November 2, 2007
Credo in the Least Common Denominator: Bond Insurance Issuers
The Bond insurance business for beginners
In our view the market was down yesterday because of the bond insurance business.
What is the bond insurance market?
About ten companies (MBIA, AMBAC, FSA owned by Dexia, CIFG owned by Natixis, Radian and a few others) have insured a total of $US 2.5trn municipal bonds and ABS. Roughly 2/3 are municipal bonds and 1/3 ABS (that's roughly US$800bn of ABS). Insuring means that if the bond issuer defaults, the bond insurer substitutes itself to the issuer and pays capital and interests as they are due.
Why does the business exist?
An issuer that is AA or A or BBB rated should in theory issue respectively a bond rated AA or A or BBB, unless it insures it. The issuer pays a premium of say 10-20bps to the bond insurer, the bond insurer collects the premium and commits that it will pay the coupon and interest if there is a default of the issuer. The issuer then saves the difference between the AA or A or BBB spread and AAA minus the premium it has paid to the bond insurance.
How does a bond insurer manage the risk?
The main sources of buffers are
* Over-collateralization, i.e. the value of the underlying assets
exceeds that of the senior tranches that are insured
* Excess spread whereby the coupon paid to the ABS is lower than the
yield on the underlying assets. This creates an additional buffer, the 'spread account'
* The issuer is often required to put equity in the instrument, which
will absorb some of the first losses if subordination is not enough
* Cross-collateralization (sometimes) whereby one bond insured can
collect excess cash flow from another bond from the same issuer
* Reinsurance
Additionally the bond insurers have very small reserves (probably a
combined US$1-2bn)
The bond insurer insures for example 80% of the value of the bond,
such that if the losses are of 20%, the insurer pays nothing. Usually bond insurers have priced in the bond insurance premium assuming that default rates would be say 3-4 times higher than the expected default rates. In total the bond insurance companies have capital of about US$20bn, or less than 1% of the total bond insured. Leverage is therefore significant, and this is really the cushion of last resort. As a result, there have been enough cushions for the bond insurers to rarely have to put any extra money in any bonds they have insured.
Put it in basic terms: 'if the assumed default rate on the assets underlying an insured bonds is of X, there should in theory be enough cushions built in the insurance contract to allow the actual losses to be for example 3 times X (sometimes much more) without the bond insurer losing money. The problem is that the market is starting to wonder whether the default rates could actually exceed the level of 3 times X for example.
What are the problems?
With the ABX and TABX index going down by the day, the default rates on all sorts of securities implied by the price available in the market are
significant: an ABX Index at 20 cents to the dollar for BBB tranches suggests implied loss of 80%. The problem is that the index currently does not reflect a fair value but rather an available price. Because nobody wants the security the price is low. If the default rates implied by these indices were to materialize then the bond insurers would likely be bankrupt. And this is what is causing the markets concern.
What if the bond insurers default?
You could think that it should not matter because they are small companies (we said a combined US$20bn of equity). The problem is that overnight the 2.5trn US$ of insured bonds would reverse back to the rating of the issuer, ie AA A or BBB as mentioned at the beginning. Imagine the impact on the economy of a downgrade of US$2.5trn worth of assets. The current LBO and CDOs write downs experienced by the banks during Q3 would appear very small in comparison to what could happen.
If banks have tens of US$bn losses, this means less capital available with the obvious implications for buy-backs, dividends, and even lending.
Conclusion
What we have described is a very gloomy scenario which we cannot imagine the regulators would allow to happen because of the far reaching economic consequences, but increasingly the market may start to worry about the bond insurance business, not just for bond insurers but for the economy as a whole.
Until the real estate market in the US stabilizes and market participants get reinsured that the buffers built-in are indeed sufficient I would be cautious about banks exposed to the business. This includes Dexia and Natixis (rated Neutral)."
In our view the market was down yesterday because of the bond insurance business.
What is the bond insurance market?
About ten companies (MBIA, AMBAC, FSA owned by Dexia, CIFG owned by Natixis, Radian and a few others) have insured a total of $US 2.5trn municipal bonds and ABS. Roughly 2/3 are municipal bonds and 1/3 ABS (that's roughly US$800bn of ABS). Insuring means that if the bond issuer defaults, the bond insurer substitutes itself to the issuer and pays capital and interests as they are due.
Why does the business exist?
An issuer that is AA or A or BBB rated should in theory issue respectively a bond rated AA or A or BBB, unless it insures it. The issuer pays a premium of say 10-20bps to the bond insurer, the bond insurer collects the premium and commits that it will pay the coupon and interest if there is a default of the issuer. The issuer then saves the difference between the AA or A or BBB spread and AAA minus the premium it has paid to the bond insurance.
How does a bond insurer manage the risk?
The main sources of buffers are
* Over-collateralization, i.e. the value of the underlying assets
exceeds that of the senior tranches that are insured
* Excess spread whereby the coupon paid to the ABS is lower than the
yield on the underlying assets. This creates an additional buffer, the 'spread account'
* The issuer is often required to put equity in the instrument, which
will absorb some of the first losses if subordination is not enough
* Cross-collateralization (sometimes) whereby one bond insured can
collect excess cash flow from another bond from the same issuer
* Reinsurance
Additionally the bond insurers have very small reserves (probably a
combined US$1-2bn)
The bond insurer insures for example 80% of the value of the bond,
such that if the losses are of 20%, the insurer pays nothing. Usually bond insurers have priced in the bond insurance premium assuming that default rates would be say 3-4 times higher than the expected default rates. In total the bond insurance companies have capital of about US$20bn, or less than 1% of the total bond insured. Leverage is therefore significant, and this is really the cushion of last resort. As a result, there have been enough cushions for the bond insurers to rarely have to put any extra money in any bonds they have insured.
Put it in basic terms: 'if the assumed default rate on the assets underlying an insured bonds is of X, there should in theory be enough cushions built in the insurance contract to allow the actual losses to be for example 3 times X (sometimes much more) without the bond insurer losing money. The problem is that the market is starting to wonder whether the default rates could actually exceed the level of 3 times X for example.
What are the problems?
With the ABX and TABX index going down by the day, the default rates on all sorts of securities implied by the price available in the market are
significant: an ABX Index at 20 cents to the dollar for BBB tranches suggests implied loss of 80%. The problem is that the index currently does not reflect a fair value but rather an available price. Because nobody wants the security the price is low. If the default rates implied by these indices were to materialize then the bond insurers would likely be bankrupt. And this is what is causing the markets concern.
What if the bond insurers default?
You could think that it should not matter because they are small companies (we said a combined US$20bn of equity). The problem is that overnight the 2.5trn US$ of insured bonds would reverse back to the rating of the issuer, ie AA A or BBB as mentioned at the beginning. Imagine the impact on the economy of a downgrade of US$2.5trn worth of assets. The current LBO and CDOs write downs experienced by the banks during Q3 would appear very small in comparison to what could happen.
If banks have tens of US$bn losses, this means less capital available with the obvious implications for buy-backs, dividends, and even lending.
Conclusion
What we have described is a very gloomy scenario which we cannot imagine the regulators would allow to happen because of the far reaching economic consequences, but increasingly the market may start to worry about the bond insurance business, not just for bond insurers but for the economy as a whole.
Until the real estate market in the US stabilizes and market participants get reinsured that the buffers built-in are indeed sufficient I would be cautious about banks exposed to the business. This includes Dexia and Natixis (rated Neutral)."
Credo: Structured Products
From a sales director from the structured products division of a US bulge bracket brokerage...
The takeaways are MLEC won't fly, SIV CP is worthless and the market is defunct, the monoline insurers are non-investment grade entities (Just check their CDS, It's at 650 today). They will survive only because the language in the insurance contracts allows them to delay payments of principal on defaulted debt until the very last cent of value is eroded or matured. Most mezzanine subprime debt will go to 0, and anything trading at this point is moving between 5 and 8 cents on the dollar.
The takeaways are MLEC won't fly, SIV CP is worthless and the market is defunct, the monoline insurers are non-investment grade entities (Just check their CDS, It's at 650 today). They will survive only because the language in the insurance contracts allows them to delay payments of principal on defaulted debt until the very last cent of value is eroded or matured. Most mezzanine subprime debt will go to 0, and anything trading at this point is moving between 5 and 8 cents on the dollar.
♭: Statistical Finesse
"They Have Got to be Kidding"
http://www.europac.net/externalframeset.asp?from=home&id=10612
Yesterday, as the dollar fell to new record lows and oil and gold prices surged to new highs, Wall Street remained fixated on wholly meaningless government data that managed to report the lowest inflation in the last half century. These bizarre numbers were integral in allowing the Commerce Department to report 3.9% annualized GDP growth in the third quarter, which was heralded by the bulls as evidence that a resilient U.S. economy had shrugged off the problems in the housing and mortgage markets. However, the government’s ability to make “economic growth” magically appear is based purely on statistical finesse.
To arrive at this rate, the government had to assume that inflation during the quarter ran at an annualized rate of .8% (that’s less than 1%). That is the lowest rate of inflation used to calculate U.S. GDP since the Eisenhower administration. With oil priced at almost $100 per barrel, gold futures trading over $800 per ounce, the dollar hitting record lows, and the Fed printing money like it is going out of style, the government has the nerve to claim that current inflation is the lowest it has been in half a century. Unbelievable!
Just in case there is some confusion, the government adjusts nominal GDP gains using the GDP deflator, which represents the inflation rate during the time period being measured. This is done to strip inflation out of the GDP calculation so that only real growth gets counted: not nominal gains that result purely from inflation.
The consensus estimate for 3rd quarter GDP growth was 3.4%. The reason we beat that number was that the government adjusted the nominal 4.7% gain by a mere .8%. Had the government assumed a higher rate of inflation, say 2.6% (identical to the rate used to deflate second quarter GDP,) the 3rd quarter gain would have been only 2.1%, well shy of the consensus forecast. My guess is that inflation is actually running at an annualized rate closer to 10%. Therefore using a more honest deflator, the U.S. economy is actually contracting, which would explain the recent anecdotal evidence provided by various economic polls, voter dissatisfaction and consumer sentiment numbers. In fact, if one simply measures U.S. GDP using gold or any other currency, it is clear that we are already in a recession.
Similar illusions are created in other numbers, such as retail sales, corporate earnings, and stock prices, which are all rising merely as a result of actual inflation being higher than the official reports. For example, higher retail sales reflect consumers paying higher prices for the products that they buy. They may in fact be buying less stuff, but are paying more for it. Further, part of the gains result from tourists using their appreciated foreign currencies to buy products cheaper here than they can in the own countries. I have heard about Canadians checking into U.S. hotels with empty suitcases, crossing the border to indulge in weekend shopping sprees.
Corporate earnings, particularly those of multi-nationals, are padded as their foreign currency denominated earnings translate into more dollars when those earnings are repatriated. However, such gains are illusions, as companies merely earn more dollars of diminished value for the goods they sell. The actual volume of exports does not necessarily improve much, as evidenced by weak industrial production and manufacturing employment. When those additional debased dollars are paid out as dividends, they confer no real increase in global purchasing power to shareholders.
Similarly, just as inflation causes prices to rise for goods and services it causes stock prices to rise as well. Though such gains may be less than the actual increase in the cost of living, as long as the government gets away with using bogus CPI numbers which fail to fully reflect inflation, Wall Street takes credit for nominal gains as if they were real.
However, as ridiculous as the phony GDP number was, yesterday’s biggest joke was a report on global competitiveness put out by the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, which ranked the U.S. economy as the world’s most competitive. To arrive at this conclusion, the forum has obliterated the obvious under a mountain of theory. In determining country rankings, the WEF weighed strengths in their "12 Pillars of Competitiveness", including: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, health and primary education, higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market sophistication, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication and innovation. Completely ignored however are the measurable results of competitiveness, notably a trade surplus and a strong currency.
It is as if the WEF decided to judge a weight loss contest without using a scale, by instead focusing only on mental attitude, dedication, perseverance, and nutritional education! As a result the prize is awarded to the fattest contestant. Based on the empirical evidence of a gargantuan trade deficit, staggering global indebtedness, and a declining currency, the United States is clearly not the most competitive economy in the world.
http://www.europac.net/externalframeset.asp?from=home&id=10612
Yesterday, as the dollar fell to new record lows and oil and gold prices surged to new highs, Wall Street remained fixated on wholly meaningless government data that managed to report the lowest inflation in the last half century. These bizarre numbers were integral in allowing the Commerce Department to report 3.9% annualized GDP growth in the third quarter, which was heralded by the bulls as evidence that a resilient U.S. economy had shrugged off the problems in the housing and mortgage markets. However, the government’s ability to make “economic growth” magically appear is based purely on statistical finesse.
To arrive at this rate, the government had to assume that inflation during the quarter ran at an annualized rate of .8% (that’s less than 1%). That is the lowest rate of inflation used to calculate U.S. GDP since the Eisenhower administration. With oil priced at almost $100 per barrel, gold futures trading over $800 per ounce, the dollar hitting record lows, and the Fed printing money like it is going out of style, the government has the nerve to claim that current inflation is the lowest it has been in half a century. Unbelievable!
Just in case there is some confusion, the government adjusts nominal GDP gains using the GDP deflator, which represents the inflation rate during the time period being measured. This is done to strip inflation out of the GDP calculation so that only real growth gets counted: not nominal gains that result purely from inflation.
The consensus estimate for 3rd quarter GDP growth was 3.4%. The reason we beat that number was that the government adjusted the nominal 4.7% gain by a mere .8%. Had the government assumed a higher rate of inflation, say 2.6% (identical to the rate used to deflate second quarter GDP,) the 3rd quarter gain would have been only 2.1%, well shy of the consensus forecast. My guess is that inflation is actually running at an annualized rate closer to 10%. Therefore using a more honest deflator, the U.S. economy is actually contracting, which would explain the recent anecdotal evidence provided by various economic polls, voter dissatisfaction and consumer sentiment numbers. In fact, if one simply measures U.S. GDP using gold or any other currency, it is clear that we are already in a recession.
Similar illusions are created in other numbers, such as retail sales, corporate earnings, and stock prices, which are all rising merely as a result of actual inflation being higher than the official reports. For example, higher retail sales reflect consumers paying higher prices for the products that they buy. They may in fact be buying less stuff, but are paying more for it. Further, part of the gains result from tourists using their appreciated foreign currencies to buy products cheaper here than they can in the own countries. I have heard about Canadians checking into U.S. hotels with empty suitcases, crossing the border to indulge in weekend shopping sprees.
Corporate earnings, particularly those of multi-nationals, are padded as their foreign currency denominated earnings translate into more dollars when those earnings are repatriated. However, such gains are illusions, as companies merely earn more dollars of diminished value for the goods they sell. The actual volume of exports does not necessarily improve much, as evidenced by weak industrial production and manufacturing employment. When those additional debased dollars are paid out as dividends, they confer no real increase in global purchasing power to shareholders.
Similarly, just as inflation causes prices to rise for goods and services it causes stock prices to rise as well. Though such gains may be less than the actual increase in the cost of living, as long as the government gets away with using bogus CPI numbers which fail to fully reflect inflation, Wall Street takes credit for nominal gains as if they were real.
However, as ridiculous as the phony GDP number was, yesterday’s biggest joke was a report on global competitiveness put out by the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, which ranked the U.S. economy as the world’s most competitive. To arrive at this conclusion, the forum has obliterated the obvious under a mountain of theory. In determining country rankings, the WEF weighed strengths in their "12 Pillars of Competitiveness", including: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, health and primary education, higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market sophistication, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication and innovation. Completely ignored however are the measurable results of competitiveness, notably a trade surplus and a strong currency.
It is as if the WEF decided to judge a weight loss contest without using a scale, by instead focusing only on mental attitude, dedication, perseverance, and nutritional education! As a result the prize is awarded to the fattest contestant. Based on the empirical evidence of a gargantuan trade deficit, staggering global indebtedness, and a declining currency, the United States is clearly not the most competitive economy in the world.
Thursday, November 1, 2007
♭: Can the Banking System Remain Solvent?
Fall in ABX sparks fresh credit fears
By Stacy-Marie Ishmael in New York and Gillian Tett in London
Published: October 31 2007 22:03 Last updated: October 31 2007 22:03
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/8d5c20e0-87e1-11dc-9464-0000779fd2ac,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F8d5c20e0-87e1-11dc-9464-0000779fd2ac.html&_i_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fsearch.ft.com%2Fsearch%3FqueryText%3DABX%2Bfears%26aje%3Dtrue%26dse%3D%26dsz%3D%26x%3D22%26y%3D10
"The ongoing crisis in the US housing market is pushing a key mortgage-linked derivatives index to new lows, threatening to unleash a further bout of credit market upheaval. The price swing in the index, known as the ABX, is particularly significant, since it is starting to reduce the value of credit instruments that carried high credit ratings, and were therefore supposed to be ultra-safe. "
Headline: $30 billion capital shortfall at Citigroup (CIBC World Markets downgrade)
NY Times excerpt: A longtime banking analyst said late last night that Citigroup may be forced to cut its dividend or sell assets to stave off what she said was a $30 BILLION CAPITAL SHORTFALL, moves that could pull down its shareholder returns for several years. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/01/business/01citi-web.html?ref=business
Bloated revenues AND Level III assets at GS... accounting shenanigans at an all time high.
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/11/01/8548/taking-the-shine-off-goldmans-glister/
By Stacy-Marie Ishmael in New York and Gillian Tett in London
Published: October 31 2007 22:03 Last updated: October 31 2007 22:03
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/8d5c20e0-87e1-11dc-9464-0000779fd2ac,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F8d5c20e0-87e1-11dc-9464-0000779fd2ac.html&_i_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fsearch.ft.com%2Fsearch%3FqueryText%3DABX%2Bfears%26aje%3Dtrue%26dse%3D%26dsz%3D%26x%3D22%26y%3D10
"The ongoing crisis in the US housing market is pushing a key mortgage-linked derivatives index to new lows, threatening to unleash a further bout of credit market upheaval. The price swing in the index, known as the ABX, is particularly significant, since it is starting to reduce the value of credit instruments that carried high credit ratings, and were therefore supposed to be ultra-safe. "
Headline: $30 billion capital shortfall at Citigroup (CIBC World Markets downgrade)
NY Times excerpt: A longtime banking analyst said late last night that Citigroup may be forced to cut its dividend or sell assets to stave off what she said was a $30 BILLION CAPITAL SHORTFALL, moves that could pull down its shareholder returns for several years. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/01/business/01citi-web.html?ref=business
Bloated revenues AND Level III assets at GS... accounting shenanigans at an all time high.
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/11/01/8548/taking-the-shine-off-goldmans-glister/
♭: Out of Key
The Kings are coming...with lies, lies mixed with Bull Manure. Honor will be forgotten.
"Cramer is pounding the table at CNBC for another 0.5% immediate rate cut."
No inflation there... time to lower FED fund rates another 50bps.
"Cramer is pounding the table at CNBC for another 0.5% immediate rate cut."
No inflation there... time to lower FED fund rates another 50bps.
Condutor Extraordinaire: FED Appoints Ben Bernanke to US C.I.O.
The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to lower its target for the federal funds rate 25 basis points to 4-1/2 percent.
Economic growth was solid in the third quarter, and strains in financial markets have eased somewhat on balance. However, the pace of economic expansion will likely slow in the near term (a statement and subsequent decision based on historical evidence right?), partly reflecting the intensification of the housing correction. Today’s action, combined with the policy action taken in September, should help forestall some of the adverse effects on the broader economy that might otherwise arise from the disruptions in financial markets and promote moderate growth over time.
Readings on core inflation have improved modestly this year LOL, but recent increases in energy and commodity prices, among other factors, may put renewed upward pressure on inflation. In this context, the Committee judges that some inflation risks remain, and it will continue to monitor inflation developments carefully.
The Committee judges that, after this action, the upside risks to inflation roughly balance the downside risks to growth. The Committee will continue to assess the effects of financial and other developments on economic prospects and will act as needed to foster price stability and sustainable economic growth.
Economic growth was solid in the third quarter, and strains in financial markets have eased somewhat on balance. However, the pace of economic expansion will likely slow in the near term (a statement and subsequent decision based on historical evidence right?), partly reflecting the intensification of the housing correction. Today’s action, combined with the policy action taken in September, should help forestall some of the adverse effects on the broader economy that might otherwise arise from the disruptions in financial markets and promote moderate growth over time.
Readings on core inflation have improved modestly this year LOL, but recent increases in energy and commodity prices, among other factors, may put renewed upward pressure on inflation. In this context, the Committee judges that some inflation risks remain, and it will continue to monitor inflation developments carefully.
The Committee judges that, after this action, the upside risks to inflation roughly balance the downside risks to growth. The Committee will continue to assess the effects of financial and other developments on economic prospects and will act as needed to foster price stability and sustainable economic growth.
Tuesday, October 30, 2007
♭: FED's Policy Below the Intended Pitch
FED's Official Policy: From a Reserve of Value to a Not so Convenient Good
Recent Fed and Treasury actions and policies are working around the clock to debase the USD. This US wealth and purchasing power destruction forces investors to seek protection in precious metals (platinum, gold, silver, uranium...) and stocks with high earnings.
This current imported and commodity fueled inflation wawe is reminiscent of the 1979-80 episode when gold, energy, farm land, natural resources and tech stocks were the inflation shelter investors sought.
The Dollar Index chart below demonstrates that the USD reached a low point in 1980 as gold was taking off. You can readily see we're back at lows once again.
Recent Fed and Treasury actions and policies are working around the clock to debase the USD. This US wealth and purchasing power destruction forces investors to seek protection in precious metals (platinum, gold, silver, uranium...) and stocks with high earnings.
This current imported and commodity fueled inflation wawe is reminiscent of the 1979-80 episode when gold, energy, farm land, natural resources and tech stocks were the inflation shelter investors sought.
The Dollar Index chart below demonstrates that the USD reached a low point in 1980 as gold was taking off. You can readily see we're back at lows once again.
Monday, October 29, 2007
Conductor Extraordinaire: George W. Bush (United States President)
Intelligence Czar Can Waive SEC Rules
Now, the White House's top spymaster can cite national security to exempt businesses from reporting requirements.
President George W. Bush has bestowed on his intelligence czar, John Negroponte, broad authority, in the name of national security, to excuse publicly traded companies from their usual accounting and securities-disclosure obligations. Notice of the development came in a brief entry in the Federal Register, dated May 5, 2006, that was opaque to the untrained eye. Unbeknownst to almost all of Washington and the financial world, Bush and every other President since Jimmy Carter have had the authority to exempt companies working on certain top-secret defense projects from portions of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. Administration officials told BusinessWeek that they believe this is the first time a President has ever delegated the authority to someone outside the Oval Office. It couldn't be immediately determined whether any company has received a waiver under this provision. The timing of Bush's move is intriguing. On the same day the President signed the memo, Porter Goss resigned as director of the Central Intelligence Agency amid criticism of ineffectiveness and poor morale at the agency. Only six days later, on May 11, USA Today reported that the National Security Agency had obtained millions of calling records of ordinary citizens provided by three major U.S. phone companies. Negroponte oversees both the CIA and NSA in his role as the administration's top intelligence official.
FEW ANSWERS.
White House spokeswoman Dana M. Perino said the timing of the May 5 Presidential memo had no significance. "There was nothing specific that prompted this memo," Perino said. In addition to refusing to explain why Bush decided to delegate this authority to Negroponte, the White House declined to say whether Bush or any other President has ever exercised the authority and allowed a company to avoid standard securities disclosure and accounting requirements. The White House wouldn't comment on whether Negroponte has granted such a waiver, and BusinessWeek so far hasn't identified any companies affected by the provision. Negroponte's office did not respond to requests for comment. Securities-law experts said they were unfamiliar with the May 5 memo and the underlying Presidential authority at issue. John C. Coffee, a securities-law professor at Columbia University, speculated that defense contractors might want to use such an exemption to mask secret assignments for the Pentagon or CIA. "What you might hide is investments: You've spent umpteen million dollars that comes out of your working capital to build a plant in Iraq," which the government wants to keep secret. "That's the kind of scenario that would be plausible," Coffee said.
AUTHORITY GRANTED.
William McLucas, the Securities & Exchange Commission's former enforcement chief, suggested that the ability to conceal financial information in the name of national security could lead some companies "to play fast and loose with their numbers." McLucas, a partner at the law firm Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr in Washington, added: "It could be that you have a bunch of books and records out there that no one knows about." The memo Bush signed on May 5, which was published seven days later in the Federal Register, had the unrevealing title "Assignment of Function Relating to Granting of Authority for Issuance of Certain Directives: Memorandum for the Director of National Intelligence." In the document, Bush addressed Negroponte, saying: "I hereby assign to you the function of the President under section 13(b)(3)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended."
A trip to the statute books showed that the amended version of the 1934 act states that "with respect to matters concerning the national security of the United States," the President or the head of an Executive Branch agency may exempt companies from certain critical legal obligations. These obligations include keeping accurate "books, records, and accounts" and maintaining "a system of internal accounting controls sufficient" to ensure the propriety of financial transactions and the preparation of financial statements in compliance with "generally accepted accounting principles."
Dawn Kopecki. BusinessWeek
Now, the White House's top spymaster can cite national security to exempt businesses from reporting requirements.
President George W. Bush has bestowed on his intelligence czar, John Negroponte, broad authority, in the name of national security, to excuse publicly traded companies from their usual accounting and securities-disclosure obligations. Notice of the development came in a brief entry in the Federal Register, dated May 5, 2006, that was opaque to the untrained eye. Unbeknownst to almost all of Washington and the financial world, Bush and every other President since Jimmy Carter have had the authority to exempt companies working on certain top-secret defense projects from portions of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. Administration officials told BusinessWeek that they believe this is the first time a President has ever delegated the authority to someone outside the Oval Office. It couldn't be immediately determined whether any company has received a waiver under this provision. The timing of Bush's move is intriguing. On the same day the President signed the memo, Porter Goss resigned as director of the Central Intelligence Agency amid criticism of ineffectiveness and poor morale at the agency. Only six days later, on May 11, USA Today reported that the National Security Agency had obtained millions of calling records of ordinary citizens provided by three major U.S. phone companies. Negroponte oversees both the CIA and NSA in his role as the administration's top intelligence official.
FEW ANSWERS.
White House spokeswoman Dana M. Perino said the timing of the May 5 Presidential memo had no significance. "There was nothing specific that prompted this memo," Perino said. In addition to refusing to explain why Bush decided to delegate this authority to Negroponte, the White House declined to say whether Bush or any other President has ever exercised the authority and allowed a company to avoid standard securities disclosure and accounting requirements. The White House wouldn't comment on whether Negroponte has granted such a waiver, and BusinessWeek so far hasn't identified any companies affected by the provision. Negroponte's office did not respond to requests for comment. Securities-law experts said they were unfamiliar with the May 5 memo and the underlying Presidential authority at issue. John C. Coffee, a securities-law professor at Columbia University, speculated that defense contractors might want to use such an exemption to mask secret assignments for the Pentagon or CIA. "What you might hide is investments: You've spent umpteen million dollars that comes out of your working capital to build a plant in Iraq," which the government wants to keep secret. "That's the kind of scenario that would be plausible," Coffee said.
AUTHORITY GRANTED.
William McLucas, the Securities & Exchange Commission's former enforcement chief, suggested that the ability to conceal financial information in the name of national security could lead some companies "to play fast and loose with their numbers." McLucas, a partner at the law firm Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr in Washington, added: "It could be that you have a bunch of books and records out there that no one knows about." The memo Bush signed on May 5, which was published seven days later in the Federal Register, had the unrevealing title "Assignment of Function Relating to Granting of Authority for Issuance of Certain Directives: Memorandum for the Director of National Intelligence." In the document, Bush addressed Negroponte, saying: "I hereby assign to you the function of the President under section 13(b)(3)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended."
A trip to the statute books showed that the amended version of the 1934 act states that "with respect to matters concerning the national security of the United States," the President or the head of an Executive Branch agency may exempt companies from certain critical legal obligations. These obligations include keeping accurate "books, records, and accounts" and maintaining "a system of internal accounting controls sufficient" to ensure the propriety of financial transactions and the preparation of financial statements in compliance with "generally accepted accounting principles."
Dawn Kopecki. BusinessWeek
Virtuoso: J.P.Morgan's Extravagant Market Manipulation Scheme
Regalian Powers, It's good to be the King!
J.P. Morgan Chase’s derivatives book has swelled by a cool 10 Trillion in notional in Q2-2007
In case any of you are wondering how big new growth of 10 Trillion in notional really is: 10 Trillion / 66 business days = 151 Billion per day
Can anyone tell me how or where it is possible to generate 151 Billion in new business per day – for 66 straight business days - in ANYTHING? Not even China can pull this off.
J.P. Morgan Chase’s derivatives book has swelled by a cool 10 Trillion in notional in Q2-2007
In case any of you are wondering how big new growth of 10 Trillion in notional really is: 10 Trillion / 66 business days = 151 Billion per day
Can anyone tell me how or where it is possible to generate 151 Billion in new business per day – for 66 straight business days - in ANYTHING? Not even China can pull this off.
As reported in the Treasury's OCC’s Quarterly Report on Bank Derivatives Activities - Second Quarter 2007, on page 23:
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/deriv/dq207.pdf
Conductor Extraordinaire: Hank Paulson (United States Secretary of the Treasury and ex-CEO at Goldman Sachs)
Henry Paulson presses for aid to sub-prime lenders
Suzy Jagger in New York
Henry Paulson, the US Treasury Secretary, is seeking to persuade the White House to offer financial compensation to American mortgage lenders that try to help troubled homeowners by renegotiating the terms of their loans.
The Times has learnt that Mr Paulson is lobbying President Bush to provide funds so that mortgage lenders can reduce the loss that they would incur from either reducing the rate of an adjustable home loan or extending the life of the mortgage to make it cheaper for the property owner.
It is understood that Mr Paulson’s proposals are meeting significant resistance within Washington, where it is perceived that such a move would be a bank bail-out scheme.
Washington is nervous about being seen to be preventing Wall Street companies from having to face the financial implications of their own lax lending practices and ill-judged investment decisions.
America is suffering its worst housing recession for 16 years. Mortgage arrears and foreclosures have soared as homeowners have struggled to keep up with their mortgage repayments.
A number of those homeowners — who typically have low incomes and poor credit histories — took out sub-prime mortgages that begin with a low introductory interest rate but which increase in their cost throughout the life of the loan.
Sub-prime borrowers bet that by the time the interest rate rises, the value of their home will have appreciated sufficiently to allow them to remortgage. Unfortunately, the housing slowdown has seen some states suffer house price falls of 40 per cent.
In the summer, President Bush sought to avert a deepening mortgage crisis and reduce the number of Americans who faced losing their homes. He urged mortgage lenders to contact borrowers and try to renegotiate the terms of their mortgages.
Earlier this week, Countrywide, America’s biggest mortgage lender, said it would begin contacting borrowers and modify $16 billion (£7.8 billion) worth of home loans whose interest rate will reset by the end of 2008.
David Sambol, Countrywide president and chief operating officer, said: “We are determined to assist borrowers who have the willingness and wherewithal to remain in their homes but need a little help to do it.”
It is expected that other mortgage lenders will follow suit, even though the cost of negotiating the terms of sub-prime mortgages will eat into their profits.
It is understood that Mr Paulson wants to offer the lenders compensation to offset these losses.
Chris Whalen, of Institutional Risk Analytics, said: “Paulson can’t go there. Paulson wouldn’t just be trying to help the banks, he would be trying to help the dealers, Wall Street as a whole. Ultimately, it’s the investors who take the hit.”
Mr Whalen added: “It is wrong for the Government to try to mandate loan modification. It sounds brutal, but a lot of these families should not have got mortgages in the first place. They couldn’t afford them. Modifying the loan in a number of cases won’t work. Historically, 30 to 40 per cent of borrowers whose loans are modified default again.”
The US Treasury and Countrywide failed to return calls yesterday.
Suzy Jagger in New York
Henry Paulson, the US Treasury Secretary, is seeking to persuade the White House to offer financial compensation to American mortgage lenders that try to help troubled homeowners by renegotiating the terms of their loans.
The Times has learnt that Mr Paulson is lobbying President Bush to provide funds so that mortgage lenders can reduce the loss that they would incur from either reducing the rate of an adjustable home loan or extending the life of the mortgage to make it cheaper for the property owner.
It is understood that Mr Paulson’s proposals are meeting significant resistance within Washington, where it is perceived that such a move would be a bank bail-out scheme.
Washington is nervous about being seen to be preventing Wall Street companies from having to face the financial implications of their own lax lending practices and ill-judged investment decisions.
America is suffering its worst housing recession for 16 years. Mortgage arrears and foreclosures have soared as homeowners have struggled to keep up with their mortgage repayments.
A number of those homeowners — who typically have low incomes and poor credit histories — took out sub-prime mortgages that begin with a low introductory interest rate but which increase in their cost throughout the life of the loan.
Sub-prime borrowers bet that by the time the interest rate rises, the value of their home will have appreciated sufficiently to allow them to remortgage. Unfortunately, the housing slowdown has seen some states suffer house price falls of 40 per cent.
In the summer, President Bush sought to avert a deepening mortgage crisis and reduce the number of Americans who faced losing their homes. He urged mortgage lenders to contact borrowers and try to renegotiate the terms of their mortgages.
Earlier this week, Countrywide, America’s biggest mortgage lender, said it would begin contacting borrowers and modify $16 billion (£7.8 billion) worth of home loans whose interest rate will reset by the end of 2008.
David Sambol, Countrywide president and chief operating officer, said: “We are determined to assist borrowers who have the willingness and wherewithal to remain in their homes but need a little help to do it.”
It is expected that other mortgage lenders will follow suit, even though the cost of negotiating the terms of sub-prime mortgages will eat into their profits.
It is understood that Mr Paulson wants to offer the lenders compensation to offset these losses.
Chris Whalen, of Institutional Risk Analytics, said: “Paulson can’t go there. Paulson wouldn’t just be trying to help the banks, he would be trying to help the dealers, Wall Street as a whole. Ultimately, it’s the investors who take the hit.”
Mr Whalen added: “It is wrong for the Government to try to mandate loan modification. It sounds brutal, but a lot of these families should not have got mortgages in the first place. They couldn’t afford them. Modifying the loan in a number of cases won’t work. Historically, 30 to 40 per cent of borrowers whose loans are modified default again.”
The US Treasury and Countrywide failed to return calls yesterday.
Monetary Debauchery
"The system of banking [is] a blot left in all our Constitutions, which, if not covered, will end in their destruction… I sincerely believe that banking institutions are more dangerous than standing armies; and that the principle of spending money to be paid by posterity… is but swindling futurity on a large scale."
Thomas Jefferson
Thomas Jefferson
Monetary Debauchery
"It is well that the people of the nation do not understand our banking and monetary system, for if they did, I believe there would be a revolution before tomorrow morning."
Henry Ford
Henry Ford
Conductor Extraordinaire: Hank Paulson (United States Secretary of the Treasury and ex-CEO at Goldman Sachs)
"The US has responded in an ad hoc way by carrying on a “strategic dialogue” with China – by far the largest economy with an exchange rate linked to the dollar – backed by congressional threats to address exchange rate issues using the tools of trade policy and references to communiqués from the Group of Seven leading industrial nations. In reality the dialogue is anything but strategic. Like so much of American international policy in recent years, it seems to confuse the firm statement of legitimate desire with the serious conduct of diplomacy."
Lawrence Summers (United States Secretary of the Treasury and M.D. at D.E. Shaw)
Lawrence Summers (United States Secretary of the Treasury and M.D. at D.E. Shaw)
Monetary Debauchery
"If Cheap Money is what the country needs, why don't we repeal the laws against counterfeiting?"
Senator Gore (OK), 1933
Senator Gore (OK), 1933
Monetary Debauchery
"There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose."
John Maynard Keynes quoting Lenine
John Maynard Keynes quoting Lenine
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